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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the epistemology
and metaphysics of universe creation on a computer. The paper begins
with F.J.Tipler’s argument that our experience is indistinguishable from
the experience of someone embedded in a perfect computer simulation of
our own universe, hence we cannot know whether or not we are part of
such a computer program ourselves. Tipler’s argument is treated as a
special case of epistemological scepticism, in a similar vein to ‘brain-in-a-
vat’ arguments. It is argued that Tipler’s hypothesis that our universe is
a program running on a digital computer in another universe, generates
empirical predictions, and is therefore a falsifiable hypothesis. The com-
puter program hypothesis is also treated as a hypothesis about what exists
beyond the physical world, and is compared with Kant’s metaphysics of
noumena. It is argued that if our universe is a program running on a digi-
tal computer, then our universe must have compact spatial topology, and
the possibilities of observationally testing this prediction are considered.
The possibility of testing the computer program hypothesis with the value
of the density parameter Ω0 is also analysed. The informational require-
ments for a computer to represent a universe exactly and completely are
considered. Consequent doubt is thrown upon Tipler’s claim that if a hi-
erarchy of computer universes exists, we would not be able to know which
‘level of implementation’ our universe exists at. It is then argued that a
digital computer simulation of a universe, or any other physical system,
does not provide a realisation of that universe or system. It is argued
that a digital computer simulation of a physical system is not objectively
related to that physical system, and therefore cannot exist as anything
else other than a physical process occurring upon the components of the
computer. It is concluded that Tipler’s sceptical hypothesis, and a related
hypothesis from Bostrom, cannot be true: it is impossible that our own
experience is indistinguishable from the experience of somebody embed-
ded in a digital computer simulation because it is impossible for anybody
to be embedded in a digital computer simulation.
Keywords: Computer Cosmology Creation Scepticism Information En-
tropy
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1 The epistemology of universe creation on a
computer
F.J.Tipler has suggested that our universe could be a computer program running
on a computer in another universe, (see, for example, p240-244 of Tipler 1989,
and p206-209 of Tipler 1995). Tipler imagines a perfect computer simulation of
our universe, which precisely matches the evolution in time of our own universe,
and precisely represents every property of every entity in our universe. Such a
simulation would simulate all the people who exist in our own universe. Such
simulated people, suggests Tipler, would reflect upon the fact that they think,
would interact with their apparent environment, and would conclude that they
exist. Their experience would be indistinguishable from our own experience,
and Tipler infers from this that we ourselves cannot know that we are not part
of such a computer program. Ex hypothesi, there is nothing in our experience
which could be evidence that we are not part of such a program, hence, it might
be argued, we cannot know that we are not part of a computer program.
This argument is a type of epistemological scepticism, similar to Descartes’
dreaming argument. Descartes raised the possibility that one could experience
a dream which is indistinguishable from the experience of a conscious, waking
individual. The sceptical argument from this is that, ex hypothesi, there is
nothing in one’s experience which could be evidence that one is not dreaming,
hence one cannot know that one is not dreaming.
A modern version of this is the ‘brain in a vat’ hypothesis. Jonathan Dancy
characterises this sceptical hypothesis as follows: “You do not know that you
are not a brain in a vat full of liquid in a laboratory, and wired to a computer
which is feeding you your current experiences under the control of some inge-
nious technician/scientist...For if you were such a brain, then, provided that the
scientist is successful, nothing in your experience could possibly reveal that you
were; for your experience is ex hypothesi identical with that of something which
is not a brain in a vat. Since you have only your own experience to appeal to,
and that experience is the same in either situation, nothing can reveal to you
which situation is the actual one,” (Dancy 1985, p10).
One can identify two distinct premises in this argument:
(a). It is possible for a brain in a vat to be fed experience of an illusional world.
(b). It is possible for that experience to be indistinguishable from our own
experience.
From these premises, the reasoning is as follows: Because the experience of
the illusional world would be indistinguishable from one’s own experience, it is
not possible to know whether or not one’s own experience is experience of a real
world, or experience of an illusional world fed to a brain in a vat. Hence, it is
not possible to know whether or not one is a brain in a vat.
There is, however, a vital ambiguity in the argument. There are two different
senses in which real world experience could be indistinguishable from illusional
world experience. One could claim either of the following two propositions:
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1. The experience of the illusional world would be indistinguishable from the
real world in terms of the detailed content of the experience.
2. The experience of the illusional world would be indistinguishable as expe-
rience from experience of the real world. In other words, the form of the
illusory experience would be indistinguishable from the form of real-world
experience.
It is not clear which of these claims Dancy is making. To illustrate the
differences between these claims, consider the following scenarios:
Firstly, suppose that an individual is born in the real world, grows-up in the
real world, and experiences the real world for 30 years, developing a range of cog-
nitive skills, and accumulating a large collection of memories. Then, one night,
whilst he lies asleep, the individual is unknowingly drugged and kidnapped by a
scientist. As the victim lies unconscious in the scientist’s laboratory, his brain is
removed and wired up to a computer. When the individual is allowed to recover
consciousness, he wakes up to experience an illusional world controlled by the
computer. Suppose that the individual retains his memories of the real world.
To prevent the individual from having a reason to believe that he is a brain
in a vat, the experience of the illusional world must be indistinguishable from
the individual’s experience of the real world. Both the form and the detailed
content of the individual’s illusory experience must be indistinguishable from
his experience of the real world. The illusional world must have the same spatial
layout and the same apparent history as that part of the real world known to
the victim, and the illusional world must evolve according to the same laws that
operate in the real world. The victim must feel that he experiences his world,
and influences events in his world, with the same body that he possessed before
he fell asleep the previous night. The victim must not recognize any difference
between the real world and the illusional world that is not explicable by the
laws of the real world. The victim must appear to perceive the same world he
perceived before he fell asleep the previous night.
If these conditions were satisfied, then the individual would have no justifi-
cation for believing that he is a brain in a vat. In accordance with conventional
definitions of knowledge, if the individual would not be justified in believing
that he is a brain in a vat, then he could not know that he is a brain in a vat.
It is possible to imagine other sceptical scenarios which do not require the
detailed nature of the illusional world to be indistinguishable from the detailed
nature of the real world. If an individual’s memories of the real world are deleted
or suppressed, and apparent memories of an illusional world completely different
from the real world are added, then experience of the illusional world would not
give the individual reason to believe that he experiences an illusional world.
The individual could experience an illusional world with a spatial layout and
history totally different to the spatial layout and history of the real world. The
illusional world could operate according to laws different to those that operate
in the real world. Nevertheless, the experience of the illusional world would
be indistinguishable, as experience, from experience of the real world. In other
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words, the form of the illusory experience, if not the detailed content, would be
indistinguishable from real-world experience.
To take another example, if an individual were fed illusory experiences from
birth, that individual would have no memories of the real world. Hence, ex-
perience of an illusory world completely different from the real world in terms
of detailed content, would not give the individual reason to believe that he
experiences an illusional world.
It is not necessary to suppose that the individual who experiences an illu-
sional world is an unwilling participant. It is possible, for example, that one’s
entire lifetime of experience upon 20th/21st century Earth, is part of a virtual
reality game, played on a distant planet in the far-future. The technology of
the far-future might enable game-players to play any role, in any factual or fic-
titious world. The game technology might suppress one’s real-world memories,
and supply the memories of the character one is playing. If the game technol-
ogy suppressed one’s real-world memories, one would be unaware of playing a
virtual reality game. The game technology might even suppress one’s real-world
cognitive skills; one might experience birth, growth and mental development in
the game world. Either way, one would have no memory of deciding to enter the
game world. Once again, the sceptical argument is that one’s own experience is
indistinguishable from the experience of someone playing such a virtual reality
game, hence one cannot know whether or not one is playing such a game.
Those sceptical arguments which require the detailed nature of the illusional
world to be indistinguishable from the detailed nature of the real world, share a
common point of vulnerability. It is possible for the hypothesis supporting such
sceptical arguments to be false, and it is possible to know that it is false.
If the detailed content of the illusory experience is indistinguishable from
the detailed content of real experience, then one can infer facts about the real
world from one’s experience, irrespective of whether one’s experience is illusory
or not. This allows one to determine, by scientific investigation, whether the
hypothesis which supports the sceptical argument, is true or false.
For example, consider the brain in a vat argument. Recall that this sceptical
argument is based upon the premise that it is possible for a brain in a vat to
be fed experience of an illusional world. Because the illusional world would
be indistinguishable, by hypothesis, from the real world, one’s sensory systems
and neurophysiology in the illusional world would be the same as one’s sensory
systems and neurophysiology in the real world. Hence, one could learn about
one’s real world physiology and neurology from one’s experience, irrespective
of whether one’s experience is experience of the real world, or the illusional
experience of a brain in a vat. One could not be led into forming false beliefs
about the kind of entity one is without the violation of the indistinguishability
condition.
Investigation of the human brain may reveal that it is impossible for it to
be stimulated in a way which would produce experience indistinguishable from
the experience of a person who is not a brain in a vat. Thus, the hypothesis
upon which the sceptical argument is based, could be false. If one knew from
neurophysiology that it is not possible for one to be a brain in a vat, then one
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would know that one is not a brain in a vat. When Dancy characterises the
brain-in-a-vat argument he states that “you have only your own experience to
appeal to,” (Dancy 1985, p10). This is false because one can also appeal to
one’s scientific understanding, based upon both theory and empirical evidence.
The other sceptical scenarios share this vulnerability: neurophysiological
investigation of the brain could reveal that it is not possible for dreams to
be indistinguishable from the experiences of a waking individual; research in
micro-electronics, computer science, and human physiology, might conclude that
totally authentic virtual reality is not possible.
Those sceptical arguments which do not require the detailed nature of the
illusional world to be indistinguishable from the detailed nature of the real world,
are more robust. If the detailed nature of the illusional world is different from
the detailed nature of the real world, then one cannot necessarily learn about
real world physiology and neurology from illusory experience. However, these
more robust sceptical scenarios are dependent upon the following premise:
• Either it is possible to delete or suppress an individual’s memories of the
real world, and to replace them with apparent memories of an illusional
world, or it is possible to feed an individual with illusory experience from
birth.
If this premise is false, then all the sceptical arguments which concern illu-
sional worlds might be refuted by empirical investigation. It is, however, difficult
to establish whether this premise is true or false. If scientific investigation re-
veals that it is impossible in our world to feed an individual illusory experiences
from birth, and that it is impossible in our world to delete or suppress an in-
dividual’s memories, and replace them with apparent memories of an illusional
world, then this alone does not establish whether the premise is true or false. If
our world is an illusional world, and if the detailed nature of the illusional world
is different from the real world, then scientific discoveries about our world, the
illusional world, do not tell us anything about the real world.
It has been assumed in this section that it is possible to make a distinction
between the form and content of experience. If such a distinction is not possible,
then the sceptical scenarios must be re-categorised as follows:
1. An individual in our world experiences an illusional world which is indis-
tinguishable from experience of our world. The individual is unaware that
his experience is illusional precisely because the illusional experience is
indistinguishable from experience of our world.
2. An individual in our world experiences an illusional world which is distin-
guishable from experience of our world. The individual is unaware of the
difference, either because his memories of our world have been deleted or
suppressed, or because he has experienced the illusional world from birth.
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In case 1 the sceptical argument is as before, with the reference to the con-
tent of experience omitted. In case 2, the sceptical argument is as follows: If
an individual in our world could experience an illusional world which is distin-
guishable from experience of our world, and if that individual could be made
unaware that what he experiences is illusional, then our own world experience
could be illusional experience, distinguishable from the real world. We cannot
know whether or not our experience is experience of the real world, or experience
of an illusional world different from the real world.
Tipler’s computer program hypothesis differs in one respect from the brain-
in-a-vat type of hypothesis. The latter hypothesis suggests that an individual in
a real world could be fed experiences of an illusional world, a world that does not
objectively exist. Tipler’s computer program hypothesis suggests that an entire
universe could be created as a computer program, and that many individuals
could be created as part of the program. This hypothesis does not merely
suggest that there is a computer program which is feeding illusory experiences to
individuals who exist in a real world. Instead, individuals capable of experience
are themselves created by the program, and the world they experience is just
as real relative to them, as our world is relative to us. It is not Tipler’s claim
that we cannot know whether or not our world is an illusional world. Instead,
he claims that “we cannot know if the universe in which we find ourselves is
actually ultimate reality,” (Tipler 1995, p208). Tipler’s claim is that we cannot
know what level of reality we experience; that we cannot know whether or not
the universe we experience has been created on a computer existing in another
universe.
However, the hypothesis that our own universe is indistinguishable from
a universe created on a computer, may be false. It will be demonstrated in
section 3 of this paper that physical predictions follow from the hypothesis
that our universe is a program running on a digital computer. For example, it
follows that the structure of the universe must be discrete, and that the spatial
universe must be compact. If these predictions are found to be false, then it is
impossible for our universe to be a program running on a digital computer. If
the predictions are falsified, then our universe is distinguishable from a universe
created on a digital computer. Alternatively, if these predictions are found to
be true, then it remains possible for our universe to be a program running on a
digital computer. Empirical investigation is necessary to determine if Tipler’s
computer program hypothesis is possible.
Nick Bostrom has proposed a distinct computer program hypothesis in which
he proposes that future ‘posthuman’ civilizations will have the technological ca-
pability to create simulations “that are indistinguishable from physical reality
for human minds in the simulation,” (Bostrom 2003, Section III). Bostrom’s
simulation hypothesis is more anthropocentric than Tipler’s hypothesis, propos-
ing not that an entire universe could be created as a computer program, and
not, as Tipler proposes, that every property of every entity be simulated, but
only “whatever is required to ensure that the simulated humans, interacting in
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normal human ways with their simulated environment, don’t notice any irreg-
ularities,” (ibid.). Bostrom proposes only that “a posthuman simulator would
have enough computing power to keep track of the detailed belief-states in all
human brains at all times. Therefore, when it saw that a human was about to
make an observation of the microscopic world, it could fill in sufficient detail in
the simulation in the appropriate domain on an as-needed basis,” (ibid.). With
the possible exception of macroscopic objects in inhabited areas, elements of the
simulated world are created on-demand for the purposes of perception, and are
not, in general, simulated independently of perception.
Whilst this paper does acknowledge the possibility of creating a computer
simulation in which merely the experience of the participants in the simulation
is indistinguishable from our own experience, the paper concentrates on the
possibility of creating a universe on a computer which is indistinguishable from
the realist conception of our own universe, i.e. this paper concentrates on the
possibility of creating on a computer a universe in which objects, properties and
processes are simulated independently of their perception by observers in the
simulation. Bostrom’s hypothesis is less amenable to empirical test precisely
because it doesn’t assume that empirical observation and measurement is in-
dicative of an independently existing world. However, sections 4 and 5 of this
paper, and, in particular, the argument that a digital computer simulation of a
system cannot provide a realisation of such a system, carry equal weight against
the hypotheses of Tipler and Bostrom.
2 The metaphysics of universe creation on a
computer
The hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a computer in another
universe is not merely a sceptical epistemological hypothesis, but a metaphysical
hypothesis, in the sense defined below.
The term ‘metaphysics’ seems to have at least two different meanings. On
the one hand, it is the study of that which possibly exists beyond the physical
world. On the other hand, it is a whole group of philosophical subjects, such as
the studies of time, causation, substance, and universals. These subjects seem
to be united by the fact that they involve very general, foundational study of
the nature of things.1
For the purpose of this paper, metaphysics is defined to be the study of
that which possibly exists beyond the empirically detectable world. In contrast,
physics is defined to be the study of the empirically detectable world. The
1The historical reasons for the double-meaning can be traced to Aristotle, as Barry Smith
explains: “The books of Aristotle’s Physics deal with material entities. His Metaphysics
(literally ‘what comes after the Physics’), on the other hand, deals with what is beyond or
behind the physical world - with immaterial entities - and thus contains theology as its most
prominent part. At the same time, however, Aristotle conceives this ‘metaphysics’ as having
as its subject matter all beings, or rather being as such. Metaphysics is accordingly identified
also as ‘first philosophy’, since it deals with the most basic principles upon which all other
sciences rest,” (Smith 1995, p373).
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hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a computer in another
universe, is clearly a metaphysical hypothesis, in the very specific sense defined
here. The hypothesis is that the computer hardware on which the program is
running cannot be empirically detected by the beings represented in the soft-
ware, hence the hypothesis is metaphysical rather than physical.
It is important to distinguish Tipler’s hypothesis from a metaphysically dis-
tinct proposal made by J.D.Barrow. Barrow suggests that “If we were to regard
the Universe as a vast computer...then we can readily envisage the laws of Na-
ture as some form of software which runs upon the particular forms of matter
that form the world of strings and elementary particles,” (Barrow 1991, p160).
In Tipler’s computer program hypothesis, the computer hardware is inacces-
sible to the people represented in the computer program; the constituents of
matter, elementary particles or not, are just as much a part of the program
software as the laws of physics. Presumably, each different type of particle or
field would correspond to a different data type in the program. Each individual
particle or field would then correspond to an instance of the relevant data type.
In programming parlance, an instance of a data type is called a data object.
Hence, the constituents of matter would correspond to data objects defined in
the program. The laws of physics would correspond to the algorithms which
act upon the data objects defined in the program. In general, entities would
correspond to data objects in a computer program, and processes would corre-
spond to algorithms. For example, an individual electron would correspond to
a data object, and the Dirac equation would correspond to an algorithm capa-
ble of acting upon any electron data object. To give another example, in the
geometrodynamical formulation of general relativity, a 3-manifold Σ, and the
tensor fields (γi,Ki, φi) representing the intrinsic geometry γi, extrinsic geome-
try Ki, and matter fields φi at time i, would all correspond to data objects. The
geometrodynamical evolution process would correspond to an algorithm which
calculates (γj+1,Kj+1, φj+1) from (γj ,Kj, φj).
After suggesting that our universe could be a computer program running on
a computer in another universe, Tipler goes one step further, and claims that
there is no need for a computer to be running the program. The state of memory
of a digital computer can be treated as a long string of binary digits, and this
represents a natural number in binary notation. Given that a computer program
maps an initial memory state to a final memory state, a computer program can
be treated as a mapping on the set of natural numbers. Tipler duly treats a
program as an abstract mapping N→ N, and claims that “if time were to exist
globally, and if the most basic things in the physical universe and the time steps
between one instant and the next were discrete,” (Tipler 1995, p208), then our
universe could be in one-to-one correspondence with such an abstract object.
Tipler acknowledges that the most basic things in the physical universe could be
continuous, hence he proposes a further generalization of what a simulation is:
“Let us say that a perfect simulation exists if the physical universe can be put
into one-to-one correspondence with some mutually consistent subcollection of
all mathematical concepts,” (ibid., p209).
This proposal does not merely suppose that mathematical Platonism is true,
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that mathematical objects exist independently of the physical universe, in an
abstract realm. Nor does it merely suppose that physical objects possess in-
trinsic mathematical properties. Instead, it supposes that physical objects can
be identified with mathematical objects. As Barrow puts it, “We exist in the
Platonic realm,” (Barrow 1992, p282). Whilst this is a fascinating idea, I shall
restrict the discussion in this paper to the hypothesis that our universe is a
program running on a computer in another universe.
The notion that there is something which exists beyond the empirically de-
tectable world has famous precedents in the history of philosophy. Various types
of thing have been postulated to exist beyond the physical world: mental enti-
ties, theological entities, and mathematical entities. These types of metaphysical
suggestion are of no relevance to this paper. Rather, the focus of attention is
the metaphysical hypothesis that there is something non-mental, non-deistic,
and non-mathematical, which exists beyond our physical world. For example,
Kant proposed that there are things-in-themselves, so-called ‘noumena’, which
exist beyond the empirically accessible world. The metaphysics of the computer
program hypothesis can be compared with the metaphysics of Kant’s noumena.
To recall, Kant suggested that there is a distinction between noumena and
phenomena. The noumena are things in themselves, and the phenomena are the
appearances of things in sensory perception. There are three possible ways of
defining noumena. The noumena could be things which exist independently of
sensory perception, they could be things which exist independently of empirical
detectability, or they could be things which exist independently of cognition al-
together. Obviously, things which exist independently of empirical detectability
also exist independently of sensory perception, and things which exist indepen-
dently of cognition also exist independently of empirical detectability.
If one merely stipulates that noumena are things which exist independently
of sensory perception, then noumena could simply be things which are too small
to see, like atoms and electrons. Things which are too small to see are still empir-
ically detectable. As a classic example, an electron leaves a luminescent trail in
a Wilson Cloud Chamber. The electron is not directly perceivable, but it is nev-
ertheless detectable. Kant seems to suggest that noumena exist independently
of both sense perception and empirical detectability of any kind. Further, Kant
seems to hold that noumena are beyond cognition altogether. The computer
program hypothesis holds that the states and processes of the computer in an-
other universe, exist beyond both sense perception and empirical detectability,
but these states and processes are not beyond cognition. What exists beyond
the physical world is conceivable, according to the computer program hypothe-
sis. In contrast, Kant seems to hold that we cannot even conceive what things
in themselves are like.
Tipler’s computer program hypothesis is consistent with a threefold dis-
tinction between the phenomenal, the physical, and the metaphysical. This
corresponds to the distinction between appearance, physical reality, and meta-
physical reality. Appearances and phenomena consist of sensory experiences
such as colours, sounds, and smells. Physical reality is the world described by
physics, the world of atoms, electrons, and space-time. The hypothetical meta-
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physical reality consists of the states and processes of a computer in another
universe. In this threefold distinction, space and time exist independently of
sensory appearances, whereas Kant believed that space and time are merely
the format into which sensory experience is arranged. Unlike Kant, Tipler’s
proposal does not relegate space-time to the merely phenomenal.
The computer program hypothesis is an interesting case because the global
metaphysics is drawn from local physics. The nature of what lies beyond the
entire physical universe (global metaphysics) is drawn from the nature of the
computer, a part of the physical world (local physics).
3 Deriving empirical predictions from the meta-
physical hypothesis
This section proposes that Tipler’s metaphysical hypothesis that our universe
is a program running on a digital computer, entails that
• The universe is discrete
• The solutions to the fundamental evolution equations of physics must be
computable functions
• The spatial universe has compact topology
These predictions are empirically testable, hence Tipler’s metaphysical com-
puter program hypothesis is empirically testable. It will be demonstrated in
this section that Tipler’s computer program hypothesis is potentially verifiable
or falsifiable by astronomical observation.2
In Bostrom’s computer simulation hypothesis it would be possible for the
simulators to create an ‘apparent’ space-time in which the universe appears to
be continuous and of non-compact topology, even though the simulated world
is actually discrete and of compact topology. The possibility of such illusions
prevents Bostrom’s computer simulation hypothesis from having empirically
testable predictions. However, as mentioned at the end of the opening section,
Tipler hypothesizes a universe simulation which creates every property of ev-
ery entity, and does not countenance the possibility of creating illusions for the
participants in the simulation. Because, in Tipler’s hypothesis, empirical obser-
vation and measurement is indicative of objects, properties and processes which
are simulated independently of their observation and measurement, Tipler’s hy-
pothesis does have testable implications.
2None of the predictions above will be invalidated by the development of quantum com-
puters. Although quantum computers might be able to perform certain calculations faster
than computers based upon the notion of a Turing machine, the collection of uncomputable
functions for a quantum computer is the same as the collection of uncomputable functions for
a Turing machine. Like existing computers, quantum computers will possess a finite mem-
ory. And like existing digital computers, a quantum computer will only be able to represent
discrete things.
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J.D.Barrow has claimed that if our universe is a computer program, then all
the laws of physics must involve computable functions, (Barrow 1991, p205). A
computable function is defined to be a function whose value can always be calcu-
lated to arbitrary precision by performing a finite sequence of well-defined steps,
often called an ‘effective procedure’.3 Certainly, if a universe unfolds in time
on a computer, evolution equations must be used to calculate each time-step
from the preceding time-step, and a solution of those evolution equations imple-
mented on a computer must be a computable function. If the solutions of the
fundamental evolution equations of physics were found to be non-computable
functions, then the computer program hypothesis would be falsified. Whilst
the computer program hypothesis therefore predicts that the solutions to the
fundamental evolution equations of physics must be computable functions, com-
putability would not be necessary to represent, at once, an entire space-time on a
computer. Computability is only a requirement if the representation attempts to
calculate one aspect of the universe from another aspect. As Tegmark remarks,
“since we can choose to picture our Universe not as a 3D world where things
happen, but as a 4D world that merely is, there is no need for the computer
to compute anything at all - it could simply store all the 4D data,” (Tegmark
1998, p26).
Note also that algorithmic compressibility is not a necessary condition to
represent a universe on a computer. A digital representation of something is
defined to be algorithmically compressible if the length, in bits, of the shortest
program capable of generating that digital representation, is shorter than the
length, in bits, of the digital representation itself. Our universe might not be
algorithmically compressible, but might still be digitally representable on a com-
puter. What follows is an attempt to derive more specific empirical predictions
from Tipler’s computer program hypothesis.
To represent the entire universe on a computer one must use either:
• A unified theory of everything.
or
• A set of different theories, each with its own limited domain of applicabil-
ity, such that the set of domains covers the entire universe.
We do not, at present, have a unified theory of everything, but we do have
a set of different theories, which grow progressively closer to covering the entire
universe, in all its detail. Of these, the only empirically verified theory which
is capable of describing the universe as a whole is general relativity. However,
although general relativity can represent the universe as a whole, when it does
so, it is only concerned with the large scale structure of the universe. It cannot
represent detail on all length scales, as a unified theory of everything could be
expected to do. Nevertheless, because general relativity has been empirically
verified, the predictions of a unified theory of everything would have to converge
3i.e for any function value f(x) and error margin ǫ, there is an effective procedure which
yields a rational number r such that |f(x)− r| < ǫ.
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to the predictions of general relativity within general relativity’s domain of
applicability.
The physical predictions derived from Tipler’s metaphysical computer pro-
gram hypothesis will be derived from an examination of how to represent a
general relativistic universe on a computer. This is perhaps a weak point of the
strategy. The universe may not be a 4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold, as it
is represented to be in general relativity. We do not know what type of thing a
unified theory of everything, incorporating a theory of quantum gravity, would
represent the universe to be. It is, therefore, a provisional decision to consider
a universe created on a computer to be a general relativistic universe.
In addition, the predictions derived assume that a digital computer is the
only type of computer which has the potential to simulate an entire universe.
Although it isn’t proven to be impossible for an analog computer to simulate an
entire universe, the current evidence suggests that an analog computer cannot
have the representational capacity to do so. An analog computer uses concrete
(and continuous) physical quantities of one sort, (e.g. electrical quantities or
hydraulic quantities), to represent concrete (and continuous) physical quantities
of another sort, (e.g. the varying height of tides). In other words, an analog
computer uses the concrete physical quantities of its physical components to
represent the physical quantities of the system to be simulated. Early analog
computers were constructed from levers, cogs, cams, discs and gears, and used
mechanical motions to perform calculations. Modern analog computers tend to
use electrical quantities, such as voltage levels, to represent the quantities of a
simulated system, and specially designed circuits are used to perform arithmetic
upon these voltage levels. Whilst an analog computer might use voltage levels
to represent the values of quantities on a simulated system, a digital computer
uses voltage levels to represent bits, and then sequences of bits encode the val-
ues of quantities on a simulated system. Analog computers tend to rely upon
a mathematical resemblance between the pattern of quantity-values possessed
by the machine and the pattern of quantity-values possessed by the simulated
system.4 Analog computers do not use the versatile, encoded, abstract repre-
sentation of physical quantities that a digital computer uses, and this limits
their representational capacity.5
It is often claimed that the variables of an analog computer are, in fact,
continuously variable, but this claim can be disputed. Variables such as electri-
cal voltage or fluid pressure are probably discrete when they are reduced to the
quantum level. Even if there are other variables which are genuinely continuous,
it would still not be possible to precisely control their value. Suppose for the
sake of argument that voltage is continuously variable. It would be impossible
to set a precise input voltage of, say, 5.34V. The best one could ever do is to
set an input voltage within some interval, say 5.34V± 0.01. This point is better
4A good example of a mechanical analog computer is an orrery, a clockwork device for
simulating the solar system. The actual position and motion of the balls representing the
planets, represents the actual position and motion of the planets.
5As an exception, Hava Siegelmann (1999) has proposed neural net analog computers which
are abstract encoders, like a digital computer.
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illustrated for the case of irrational numbers. It is impossible to set an input
voltage of pi, and this is not because of the limitations of current technology,
but because infinite precision is not attainable.
In general relativity, space is represented as a 3-dimensional differential man-
ifold, and space-time is represented as a 4-dimensional differential manifold.
Whilst every manifold has the cardinality of the continuum, a digital computer,
as it is currently understood, can only deal with discrete items of data. The
most crucial fact to recognize about a computer program is that the data objects
defined in it are built from Z, the set of integers. In contrast, the objects of
analytic mathematics are built from R, the set of real numbers. The memory of
a classical, (i.e. non-quantum), digital computer consists of electronic circuits
which have two possible voltage states. These voltage states are represented
by binary digits, otherwise known as ‘bits’. An element of memory is therefore
called a ‘bit’. Each bit of memory has two possible states, represented as 0 and
1. The set of possible states of a bit can be represented as Z2 = Z/2Z = {0, 1},
the additive group of integers, modulo 2. Z2 is a realisation of the cyclic group
of two elements. Each byte of memory, a string of 8 bits, and the smallest
addressable unit of memory, can be represented by
(Z2)
8 = Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2,
the 8-fold Cartesian product of Z2. Thus, for a classical computer with n bytes
of memory, the entire memory can be represented by (Z2)
8n, a discrete mathe-
matical structure of 8n dimensions. All the data objects defined in a program
correspond to regions of memory, hence the data objects defined in a program
are built from subsets of the discrete mathematical structure (Z2)
8n.
The memory of a quantum computer consists of physical systems which
possess a quantum state space isomorphic to the 2-dimensional complex Hilbert
space C2. Each such memory element is referred to as a ‘qubit’, or ‘Qbit’. A
string of n qubits is represented by the n-fold tensor product of C2. Hence, the
state of 8 qubits is represented by a vector in
(C2)8 = C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2
As a consequence, the state of the n qubits can be quantum mechanically en-
tangled.
Each qubit is considered to have a fixed basis, {v0, v1}. Each vector in the
n-fold tensor product consists of a complex linear combination of the 2n basis
vectors {vi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vin : i1 = 0, 1, ..., in = 0, 1}. The algorithms of a quantum
computer correspond to unitary operators upon these complex Hilbert spaces.
Because C2 is built from the set of real numbers, and because each qubit C2
possesses a continuum of quantum states, it might appear that a quantum com-
puter can store an infinite amount of information. This appearance, however,
is deceptive. Whilst there are a continuum of possible unitary operators on
a qubit Hilbert space, each quantum computer will only be engineered to im-
plement a finite collection. Moreover, each quantum computation must cease
with a measurement of the state of the n qubits, and this collapses the state
13
from a linear combination of the basis vectors into one of the fixed basis vec-
tors, vi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vin . The initial state on which the unitary transformations can
operate is also such a state, and as Mermin comments, “the entire role of the
state of the Qbits at any stage of a succession of unitary transformations is to
encapsulate the probability of the outcomes, should the final measurement be
made at that stage of the process,” (2002, p16). Thus, a quantum computer,
like a classical computer, possesses a finite number of accessible states. In fact,
n qubits of memory possess exactly the same number of accessible states as n
bits of memory, namely 2n. The data objects defined in a program running on
a quantum computer are discrete objects.
Because every manifold has the cardinality of the continuum, and because
digital computers can only represent discrete objects, it is impossible to exactly
represent a manifold on a digital computer. It is, therefore, impossible on a dig-
ital computer to exactly represent space and space-time as they are represented
in general relativity.
If space and space-time actually are manifolds, and if a manifold cannot be
exactly represented on a digital computer, then space and space-time cannot
be exactly represented on a digital computer. If the space and space-time of
our universe cannot be exactly represented on a digital computer, then our
universe cannot be a computer program running on a digital computer in another
universe.
However, as already mentioned, the space and space-time of our universe
may not actually be manifolds. Space and space-time may not exactly be as
they are represented to be in general relativity. Perhaps space and space-time
are discrete, and perhaps the manifolds of general relativity only provide an
idealisation of a discrete reality. The space and space-time of our universe
can only be exactly represented on a digital computer if space and space-time
actually are discrete.
Loop quantum gravity offers, perhaps, a mathematically rigorous means to
quantize general relativity, and loop quantum gravity suggests that space is
discrete in some sense. Using Ashtekar’s ‘new variables’ approach, canonical
general relativity can be cast in the form of a canonical gauge theory, albeit
a gauge theory with additional constraints to the Gauss constraint. The con-
figuration space is a space of SU(2)-connections on a principal fibre bundle
over a 3-manifold Σ. In loop quantum gravity, each closed curve (‘loop’) in the
3-manifold defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections. This func-
tional is obtained by taking the holonomy of each connection around the loop,
representing that group element as an operator on a vector space, and then
taking the trace of that operator. Furthermore, each ‘spin network’ embedded
in the 3-manifold defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections. A
spin network, treated in isolation, is a discrete mathematical object consisting
of a graph, (a collection of vertices and edges), an irreducible representation of
SU(2) assigned to each edge, and an ‘intertwining’ operator between such repre-
sentations assigned to each vertex. Such a graph embedded in the 3-manifold Σ
defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections by taking the holonomy
of a connection along each edge, using the representations to obtain operators
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along each edge, forming the tensor product of all those operators, tensoring
that with all the intertwining operators, and then contracting to obtain a num-
ber, the number assigned to the connection, (Baez 1995, p19). Such functionals
turn out to be eigenvectors of operators which purportedly represent the area
of surfaces in the 3-manifold and the volume of regions in the 3-manifold. Fur-
thermore, these operators have discrete spectra.
If one accepts that quantum theory provides a complete description of a
physical system, then, arguably, it is not the configurations of the classical
system which exist, but the quantum state function(al). Hence, in the case of
loop quantum gravity, the 3-manifold used to define the classical configuration
space does not exist. Rather, it is the state functional defined by the spin
network which exists.
Many important questions remain. For example, the dynamics of loop quan-
tum gravity remain intransigent, and there is no obvious classical limit to the
theory. Whilst it is claimed that area and volume are discrete, what are they
the area and volume of, if a 3-manifold does not exist? Are area and volume
re-interpreted as properties of spin networks?
The established means of finding a discrete approximation to a manifold, is
to find a cell complex which is homeomorphic to the manifold. In particular,
one tries to find a simplicial complex which is homeomorphic to the manifold.6
The schema of the simplicial complex is a discrete mathematical object, which
can be exactly represented on a computer. By representing the schema on a
computer, one approximately represents the manifold.
If the schema of a simplicial complex is the natural discrete approximation
to a manifold, then, conversely, the manifold can be said to be the natural
continuum idealisation of the schema. If space and space-time are actually
discrete, but if they can also be represented in a continuum idealisation as a
3-manifold and 4-manifold, respectively, then it is natural to suggest that space
is actually a 3-dimensional schema, and space-time is actually a 4-dimensional
schema. Regge calculus is generally considered to be the ‘discretized’ version of
general relativity, and Regge calculus duly represents space and space-time as
a simplicial complex.
Loop quantum gravity demonstrates that, although space and space-time
might not be manifolds, they might not be the schema of simplicial complexes
either. However, if space and space-time actually are discrete, it may be that
6This should be distinguished from the Whitehead triangulation of a smooth manifold,
which is a functor rather than an isomorphism. In dimension 6 and below, the equivalence
classes of smooth manifolds up to diffeomorphism are in one-to-one correspondence with the
equivalence classes of piecewise-linear (PL) manifolds up to PL-isomorphism, and every PL-
manifold is PL-isomorphic to a simplicial complex, (Pfeiffer 2004, p17-18). This doesn’t entail
that every smooth 4-manifold is such that its underlying topological manifold is homeomorphic
with a simplicial complex. In dimension 4, there is a significant discrepancy between the
category of topological manifolds up to homeomorphism, and the category of smooth manifolds
up to diffeomorphism. There are topological 4-manifolds which have no differential structure,
and therefore no Whitehead triangulation, and there are families of smooth 4-manifolds which
share the same underlying topological manifold, up to homeomorphism, but which are pairwise
non-diffeomorphic, and therefore have distinct Whitehead triangulations.
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they are best represented by loop quantum gravity on small scales, and best
represented by the schema of simplicial complexes on large scales.
Some explanation of the mathematics is in order here. An n-cell is an object
which is homeomorphic with the n-ball in n-dimensional Euclidean space, Dn =
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ ≤ 1}. For example, a 2-ball is a disc, bounded by a circle, while
a 3-ball is a solid ball bounded by a 2-sphere. Any polygon is homeomorphic
with a 2-ball, and is therefore a 2-cell. Any solid polyhedron is homeomorphic
with a 3-ball, and is therefore a 3-cell.
A cell-complex is obtained by pasting together any number of cells, so that
the faces of the cells are either disjoint, or so that they coincide completely. A
3-dimensional cell-complex is obtained by pasting together 3-cells in such a way
that the faces, edges and vertices of the cells are either disjoint, or they coincide
completely.
The most interesting type of cell is a simplex. A 0-simplex is a point, or
‘vertex’; a 1-simplex is a line segment, or ‘edge’; a 2-simplex is a triangle; and
a 3-simplex is a solid tetrahedron. By pasting together simplices, one obtains
a simplicial complex, (see Stillwell 1992, p23-24). A 3-dimensional simplicial
complex is obtained by pasting together solid tetrahedra. The schema of a 3-
dimensional simplicial complex can be specified as follows. First, one declares
all the vertices in the complex. Next, one can specify which subsets of the set of
vertices correspond to simplexes. By specifying a pair of vertices, {Pi, Pj}, one
indicates that those vertices are connected by an edge. One can then specify
which triples {Pi, Pj , Pk} of vertices correspond to the faces, and finally one can
list which quadruples {Pi, Pj , Pk, Pl} of vertices correspond to the tetrahedra.
One could alternatively give each edge a name, and then specify which triples
of adjoining edges are connected by a face. One would then name each face,
and specify which quadruples of adjoining faces are connected by a tetrahedron,
(see Geroch and Hartle 1986, p546).
Although the manifold models of general relativity may be idealisations, one
particular manifold model may eventually be verified by observation, to the
exclusion of all others. To be specific, either a Friedmann-Roberston-Walker
(FRW) model, a small perturbation of a FRW model, or an exact solution close
to a FRW model, may be verified by astronomical observation. If the computer
program hypothesis predicts that space or space-time is actually the schema of
a simplicial complex on large scales, then the manifold model of the large-scale
universe must be homeomorphic with a simplicial complex whose schema can
be represented on a computer. It is therefore important to determine which
manifold models of general relativity can be discretely represented on a digital
computer by the schema of a simplicial complex. If a particular manifold model
were to be verified by astronomical observation, but that model could not be
represented by a schema on a digital computer, then the hypothesis that our
universe is a computer program running on a digital computer would be falsified.
Suppose, then, that one tries to represent space-time on a computer with the
schema of a 4-dimensional simplicial complex. Unfortunately, it is not known
if every 4-manifold is homeomorphic to a simplicial complex, (Stillwell 1992,
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p247).7 Hence, there may be 4-manifolds which cannot be discretely repre-
sented by the schema of a simplicial complex. If the space-time of the universe
has a manifold idealisation which does not have a homeomorphic simplicial
complex, then the space-time of the universe would not be representable on a
computer by the schema of a simplicial complex. If there were no other means
of discretely representing such a 4-manifold on a computer, then the space-time
of the universe would not be representable on a digital computer.
More seriously, because a computer can only store a finite amount of data,
it can only represent the schema of a finite simplicial complex, a simplicial
complex which contains a finite number of simplexes. A finite simplicial complex
can only be homeomorphic to a compact manifold, hence only a compact 4-
manifold is discretely representable by a schema on a computer. Now, a compact
four-manifold can only possess a Lorentzian metric if its Euler characteristic is
zero. If one hypothesizes that the entire 4-dimensional history of our universe
is a representation on a computer, then one derives the potentially testable
prediction that the topology of our space-time must be compact, and of Euler
characteristic zero.
As an alternative, the geometrodynamical formulation of general relativ-
ity employs a so-called ‘3+1’ decomposition of space-time. One chooses a 3-
manifold Σ, and one studies the time-evolution of the geometry and matter
fields on Σ. As the geometry and matter fields evolve, a 4-dimensional space-
time unfolds. Such a space-time will, of necessity, have the topology of R1 ×Σ.
The geometrodynamical formulation is advantageous because of Moise’s tri-
angulation theorem for 3-manifolds, (Stillwell 1992, p25 and p242). Moise
demonstrated that every 3-manifold is homeomorphic with a simplicial com-
plex; one says that every 3-manifold can be ‘triangulated’.8 Although it is true
that every n-manifold can be triangulated for n ≤ 3, it is, to reiterate, unknown
whether all 4-manifolds can be triangulated.
Moise’s theorem means that any possible topology of the spatial universe can
be discretely represented with the schema of a 3-dimensional simplicial complex.
Once again, however, a digital computer can only represent the schema of a finite
simplicial complex. Whilst a compact 3-manifold is homeomorphic with a finite
simplicial complex, a non-compact 3-manifold can only be homeomorphic with
an infinite simplicial complex, a complex which contains an infinite number of
simplexes.
Only a compact 3-manifold can be homeomorphic with a 3-dimensional sim-
plicial complex whose schema is representable on a digital computer. Hence, if
our universe is a program running on a digital computer, then our spatial uni-
verse must have a compact spatial topology in a continuum idealisation. Tipler’s
7Not to be confused with Markov’s demonstration that the homeomorphism problem is
unsolvable for triangulated 4-manifolds. In other words, given a pair of 4-manifolds which are
homeomorphic to simplicial complexes, there is no algorithm to determine if they are mutually
homeomorphic.
8This coincides with the Whitehead triangulation of a smooth 3-manifold. Every topologi-
cal manifold of dimension 3 or lower has a unique PL-structure, and homeomorphic topological
manifolds have PL-isomorphic PL-structures, (Pfeiffer 2004, p37).
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hypothesis that our universe is a program on a digital computer, predicts that
the spatial universe is discrete, and yields the potentially testable prediction
that our universe has compact spatial topology in a continuum idealisation.
The prediction of compact spatial topology means that the Euclidean R3
and hyperbolic H3 FRW universes are both inconsistent with Tipler’s computer
program hypothesis. The only FRW universe which has both simply connected
and compact spatial topology, is the S3-universe. Hence, the only simply con-
nected FRW universe which could be discretely represented on a computer, is
the S3-universe. There are, however, a host of multiply connected compact
FRW universes. The spatial geometry of each such universe is obtained as a
quotient Σ/Γ of a simply connected Riemannian space form9 Σ, where Γ is a
discrete, properly discontinuous, fixed-point free subgroup of the isometry group
I(Σ), (O’Neill 1983, p243 and Boothby 1986, p406, Theorem 6.5).
Compact FRW models exist for any value of sectional curvature k. Of the 18
flat, k = 0, 3-dimensional Riemannian space forms, 10 are compact. Given that
one can only create compact FRW universes on a computer, it follows that one
can only create 10 topologically different k = 0 FRW universes on a computer.
All of the 3-dimensional Riemannian space forms of constant positive cur-
vature are compact, hence they could all be created on a computer.
Whilst there are compact and non-compact quotients H3/Γ, there are an
infinite number of such compact quotients. The work of Thurston demonstrates
that ‘most’ compact and orientable 3-manifolds can be equipped with a com-
plete Riemannian metric tensor of constant negative sectional curvature. This
means that ‘most’ compact, orientable 3-manifolds can be obtained as a quo-
tient H3/Γ of hyperbolic 3-space.10 One can therefore create an infinite number
of possible negative curvature FRW universes on a computer. However, there is
no compact k = −1 space form which is globally homogeneous. H3 itself is the
only globally homogeneous 3-dimensional Riemannian space form of constant
negative curvature, and H3 is, of course, non-compact. Given that one can only
create a compact universe on a computer, one cannot create a k = −1 FRW uni-
verse on a computer which is globally homogeneous. Thus, if our own universe
is a globally homogeneous k = −1 FRW universe, it cannot exist on a computer.
However, a locally homogeneous k = −1 FRW universe, with compact, multiply
connected topology, could exist on a computer, and it is only local homogeneity
which our astronomical observations are capable of detecting.
In practice it is difficult to test the prediction of compact spatial topology.
Observational evidence currently indicates that our universe is a FRW universe,
but there is no observable parameter in a FRW model which determines the
spatial topology. Thus, there is no necessary link between the spatial topology
of a FRW universe and the value of the density parameter Ω0; one cannot infer
the spatial topology of our universe from Ω0.
However, in a ‘small’, compact, multiply connected universe, it is possible
to see around the entire universe. To understand this, begin by recalling that a
9A complete and connected Riemannian manifold of constant sectional curvature is called
a Riemannian space form.
10The meaning of ‘most’ in this context involves Dehn surgery, (Besse 1987, p159-160).
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Riemannian manifold (Σ, γ) has a natural metric space structure. The metric
tensor γ determines a Riemannian distance d(p, q) between any pair of points
p, q ∈ Σ. The Riemannian distance d(p, q) is dimensionless, in the sense that
it lacks any physical units. In a FRW model, it is the scale factor R(t) which
introduces physical units of distance. The physical distance between p and q at
time t is R(t)d(p, q). Because R(t) has physical units, so does R(t)d(p, q).
For any FRW universe, one can calculate the maximum Riemannian dis-
tance, dmax, that light has travelled by a time t0, which is considered to be the
present time. The relevant equation is
dmax(t0) =
∫ t0
0
c
R(t)
dt
A civilization located at some point p in space, will, at time t0, be able to
see no further, in any direction, than a Riemannian distance of dmax(t0). This
distance can therefore be referred to as the Riemannian horizon distance. It is,
of course, a dimensionless quantity.
Now, recalling that the diameter of a metric space is the supremum of the
distances which can separate pairs of points, it is a fact that any compact Rie-
mannian manifold is a metric space of finite diameter. If one created, on a
computer, a FRW universe in which (Σ, γ) were a compact Riemannian man-
ifold of sufficiently small diameter, diam (Σ, γ), then the Riemannian horizon
distance dmax(t0) could exceed diam (Σ, γ) by the time t0 ∼ 10
10. If so, the
horizon would have disappeared for the observers in that universe. They would
be able to see their entire spatial universe. No point of their universe could be
separated from them by a Riemannian distance greater than diam (Σ, γ), so if
dmax(t0) ≥ diam (Σ, γ), then they would be able to receive light from all regions
of their spatial universe.
In such universes, individual galaxies and clusters of galaxies would produce
multiple images upon the celestial sphere of planet-bound observers, (see El-
lis 1971). Different compact spatial topologies and geometries would produce
different patterns of ghost images and multiple images upon the celestial sphere.
However, although compact spatial topology is a necessary condition for
the entire spatial universe to be visible, it is not a sufficient condition. Our
universe might have compact spatial topology, but if it is a ‘large’ compact
universe, then all of space will not be visible. For all of space to be visible
when the universe is only ∼ 1010 yrs old, the Riemannian manifold (Σ, γ) which
represents the spatial universe must be sufficiently small, as well as compact,
Even if our spatial universe is small and compact, it would be extremely difficult
to identify multiple images of galaxy clusters. Hence, although the presence of
multiple images would verify the hypothesis of a small, compact universe, the
fact that they have not been identified at the current time does not falsify the
hypothesis. A better means of testing the hypothesis is to search for paired
circles in the microwave background radiation. Recent research indicates that
if such paired circles exist, then one could derive the spatial topology from
the specific pattern of paired circles, (see Cornish, Spergel, Starkman 1998).
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The CMBR power spectrum can also be used to determine whether our spatial
universe is a small compact universe. A small compact universe would affect
the CMBR power spectrum on large angular scales. The WMAP satellite has
revealed anomalies in the CMBR power spectrum on large angular scales. The
quadrupole l = 2 mode was found to be about 1/7 the strength predicted for
an infinite flat universe, while the octopole l = 3 mode was 72% of the strength
predicted for such a non-compact k = 0 universe, (Luminet et al 2003, p3).
The presence of paired circles or specific anomalies in the CMBR power spec-
trum would verify that the universe is spatially compact, and would thereby ver-
ify Tipler’s computer program hypothesis. Unfortunately, the absence of paired
circles or anomalies in the power spectrum would not entail that the spatial uni-
verse is non-compact. Our universe could simply be a large compact universe.
Hence, the absence of paired circles or anomalies in the power spectrum would
not falsify the computer program hypothesis.
Predictions about the lifetime of our universe are easier to test than predic-
tions about the spatial topology. The lifetime of our universe is determined by
parameters such as the Hubble parameter H0 and the density parameter Ω0,
which can be inferred from observation. Hence, if the computer program hy-
pothesis made predictions about the lifetime of our universe, it would be easier
to test it. If a universe is represented by a Lorentzian manifold (M, g), then the
lifetime of the universe corresponds to the ‘timelike diameter’ of (M, g). The
timelike diameter of (M, g) is the supremum of the length of all past-directed
timelike curves in (M, g). As Beem and Ehrlich comment, “the timelike diame-
ter represents the supremum of possible proper times any particle could possibly
experience in the given space-time,” (Beem and Ehrlich 1980, p329).
If a Lorentzian manifold with an infinite timelike diameter were represented
by a numerical solution of the Einstein geometrodynamical equations, and if the
size of the time steps in the numerical solution were constant, then an infinite
number of time steps would be necessary. An infinite amount of information
would have to be processed. The ever-expanding k ≤ 0 FRW universes are
examples of universes with an infinite lifetime. If a computer in a universe
with an infinite lifetime could process information at a constant rate, then it
could process an infinite amount of information. However, an ever-expanding
universe will suffer an entropy ‘heat death’, the amount of free energy available
converging to zero as t → ∞. Brillouin’s inequality entails that there is a
minimum, positive amount of free energy which must be expended to irreversibly
process, or erase, a bit of information. Where ∆I is the amount of information
processed in bits,
∆I ≤ ∆E/kBT ln 2 .
∆E is the free energy expended, T is the absolute temperature in degrees K,
and kB is Boltzmann’s constant, (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p661). At first sight,
this suggests that it is impossible to process an infinite amount of information in
an ever-expanding universe because the amount of free energy converges to zero.
However, the amount of energy which must be expended per bit of information
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processed is temperature dependent. From the inequality above, one can derive
the following constraint on the rate at which information can be processed:
dI/dt ≤
dE/dt
kBT ln 2
.
In turn, this entails the following constraint on the total amount of information
I which can be processed between the current time t0 and some future time tf ,
which might be ∞:
I =
∫ tf
t0
dI
dt
dt ≤ (kB ln 2)
−1
∫ tf
t0
T−1
dE
dt
dt .
If the temperature converges to zero, T → 0, as it does in an ever-expanding
Ω0 ≤ 1 universe, then the amount of free energy which needs to be expended
per bit converges to zero. Hence, although the amount of free energy converges
to zero, so also does the amount of free energy which needs to be expended
per bit. Thus, because the integral
∫
∞
t0
T−1(dE/dt) dt can diverge, it may still
be possible to process an infinite amount of information in an ever-expanding
universe, even if the total free energy expended
∫
∞
t0
(dE/dt) dt is finite, (Barrow
and Tipler 1986, p663).
In Ω0 > 1 universes, because the temperature diverges near the final singu-
larity, the rate at which free energy is expended dE/dt, and therefore the total
energy expended
∫ tf
t0
(dE/dt) dt, must diverge if the total information processed
is to diverge.
If Ω0 ≤ 1 in our universe, as current astronomical evidence indicates, then
our universe has an infinite timelike diameter. Assuming that the simulation of
such a universe would require an infinite amount of information to be processed,
the possibility of the computer program hypothesis then rests upon whether it
is physically possible for the integral
∫ tf
t0
T−1(dE/dt) dt to diverge in either a
Ω0 ≤ 1 universe or a Ω0 > 1 universe. In both cases this remains a matter of
debate. If it is not physically possible for the integral to diverge in either case,
and if the observation that Ω0 ≤ 1 in our universe is reliable, then could one
conclude that our universe is not a program running on a computer in another
universe? If it is impossible to process an infinite amount of information, then
the only type of universe which could be entirely simulated on a computer would
be a finite lifetime universe. However, as Bostrom might perhaps suggest, it
remains possible that a partial simulation of a Ω0 ≤ 1 universe could be created
on a computer in another universe, a finite lifetime subset of the entire Ω0 ≤ 1
universe. Hence, even if our universe is a Ω0 ≤ 1 universe, and even if it is
impossible to process an infinite amount of information, our universe could be
a finite lifetime simulation running on a computer in another universe.
Not only could Tipler’s computer program hypothesis be falsified by empir-
ical investigation, as considered above, but there are logical constraints upon
what it is possible to simulate on a computer.
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A computer is a finite volume subsystem of a universe, which is capable of
representing the state of other systems. A system can represent, exactly and
completely, the state of another system, if and only if the amount of information
which can be coded in the first system is greater than or equal to the amount
of information which can be coded in the other system. An entire universe is
a special type of system. Hence, a subsystem of a universe A can represent,
exactly and completely, the state of a universe B, if and only if the amount of
information which can be coded in the subsystem of A is greater than or equal
to the amount of information which can be coded in universe B.
As a special case, if the amount of information which can be coded in a
subsystem of a universe A is less than the amount of information which can
be coded in the entire universe A , then it is impossible for the subsystem of
universe A to represent, exactly and completely, the entire universe A .
The amount of information which can be coded in a system is determined by
the number of different possible states of the system. If N denotes the number
of possible states, then the amount of information I which can be coded, in bits,
is simply I = log2N . Hence, if the number of possible states of a subsystem
of a universe is less than the number of possible states of the entire universe,
then it is impossible for that subsystem to represent, exactly and completely,
the entire universe.
However, just because a system is a subsystem of a universe, it does not
follow that the number of possible states of the system is less than the number
of possible states of the universe. True, if the number of possible states of a
subsystem is finite, then by virtue of being a subsystem, that finite number must
be smaller than the number of possible states of the entire universe. For every
state of a subsystem, there must be multiple states of the entire universe which
induce the same state upon that subsystem, hence the number of possible states
of the entire universe must be larger. However, if the number of possible states
of a subsystem is not finite, then it is possible that it has the same number
of possible states as the entire universe. A priori, it is quite possible that a
subsystem of a universe A , and the entire universe A , both possess an infinite
number of states. If the state space of a subsystem has the same cardinality
as the state space of the entire universe, then, by definition, there exists at
least one bijective mapping between the two state spaces. Any such bijective
mapping would enable the states of the entire universe to be represented by the
states of the subsystem.
This argument can be presented in another way. If a subsystem S of our
universe represents the entire universe U , it must also represent S representing
U . If it does this, it must also represent S representing S representing U .
And so on, ad infinitum. This is possible only if the subsystem can store an
infinite amount of information.
If the entire universe only has a finite number of possible states, then a
subsystem will also have a finite number of states, and the number of subsystem
states will be smaller than the number of universe states. However, if the
entire universe has an infinite number of possible states, then it is possible for
a subsystem to have either a finite number or an infinite number of possible
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states.
If the entire universe has an infinite number of possible states, then it could
conceivably possess either a continuous infinity of possible states, or a discrete
infinity. A digital computer could only represent the universe exactly if the
universe is discrete, hence the only case of interest here is the case in which
the universe has a discrete infinity of possible states. A digital computer could
only represent the universe exactly and completely if the entire universe and the
computer subsystem of the universe both possess a discrete infinity of possible
states. In other words, a digital computer could only represent the universe
exactly and completely if both the computer and the universe can code a discrete
infinity of information.
A computer is a finite volume subsystem of the universe, hence to determine
if a computer could code the same amount of information as the entire universe,
it is necessary to determine if a finite volume subsystem can code a finite or
infinite amount of information. To answer this question, it is necessary to
determine what the physical structure of the universe is.
At present, it appears that there are discrete levels of physical structure in
the universe. All macroscopic material objects in our universe are composed of
chemical elements and chemical compounds. The latter are composed of atoms
in different combinations and organizations. Atoms are composed of electrons
and atomic nuclei. The nuclei of atoms are themselves composed of protons
and neutrons, which are themselves composed of quarks. The parts of material
objects do not appear to lie on a continuum.
Electrons and quarks are purported to be elementary particles, pieces of
matter which have no parts. If elementary particles do exist, then our universe
could be said to have a finite lower level of structure. There would be no levels
of structure below the level of elementary particles.
I propose that a finite volume subsystem is limited to coding a finite amount
of information if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• The number of structure levels available in a finite volume of space is
finite.
• On each structure level, there is a finite set of parts in a finite volume of
space.
• Each of the parts on each level of structure has a finite set of states.
A finite volume subsystem which satisfies these conditions has only a fi-
nite number of possible states, and therefore cannot code the same amount of
information which can be coded in the entire universe.
To reiterate, a computer could only represent the universe exactly and com-
pletely if a finite volume subsystem can code a discrete infinity of information.
It seems safe to assume that, on each level of structure, there is a finite set of
parts in any finite volume of space. The Bekenstein bound11 and the so-called
11Otherwise known as the universal entropy bound.
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holographic bound of Susskind and ’t Hooft, purportedly entail that the parts
on each level of structure have a finite set of states, (Bekenstein 2003). More-
over, the existence of elementary particles would mean that there is a finite set
of structure levels in each finite volume of space. It would appear, therefore, at
first sight, that all three conditions are satisfied. It would appear that a finite
volume subsystem cannot code a discrete infinity of information, and it would
appear that a computer cannot represent the universe exactly and completely.
However, further thought raises some doubts. Both the Bekenstein bound
and the holographic bound place an upper limit on the entropy within a finite
volume of space. Given a finite quantity of weakly self-gravitating energy E in a
spherical volume of radius R, which is isolated from other systems, (Bekenstein
2004), the entropy S is subject to the following upper bound:
S ≤ 2piER/~c .
The holographic bound is independent of the quantity of energy, and places
the following limit on the entropy of a spherical volume of radius R, which is
isolated from other systems:
S ≤ pic3R2/~G .
In both cases, it is then assumed that a finite upper limit to the entropy of
a finite volume of space entails a finite upper limit to the information storage
capacity of that volume. This might be inferred from the following relationship:
Information = Maximum entropy− entropy .
By implication, it is the statistical states or macrostates of a system which
are the bearers of entropy and information here. The states which provide a
complete, detailed description of a system are referred to as ‘microstates’. A
statistical state expresses only partial knowledge of the state of a system, and, in
classical mechanics at least, corresponds to a probability distribution ρ defined
upon the space of microstates Γ. A macrostate is a set of macroscopically indis-
tinguishable microstates ΓM ⊂ Γ, and corresponds to a special type of statistical
state in which the probability distribution is of a constant value |ΓM |
−1 on ΓM ,
and zero elsewhere.12 The microstate of a system inherits the entropy and in-
formation of the macrostate to which it belongs. The entropy of an isolated
system increases because the microstate of the system moves into macrostates
of ever greater entropy. The equation above means that the information pos-
sessed by a system at a point in time is the difference between the maximum
entropy of the system, and the entropy possessed by the system at that point
in time. The maximum information which can be possessed by a system is that
which it possesses when the system’s entropy is zero. Hence, according to the
relationship above, the maximum information equals the maximum entropy.
Whether this entails that a finite volume of space possesses a finite number
of states is a different question. In classical mechanics, a system consisting of n
12|ΓM | denotes the volume of ΓM .
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particles has a 6n-dimensional continuum state space Γ, called the phase space.
The entropy S(ρ) of a statistical state ρ in classical mechanics is defined to be
S(ρ) = −kB
∫
Γ
ρ log ρ dµ ,
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant. In the case of a macrostate ρM , this reduces
to
S(ρM ) = −kB
∫
ΓM
|ΓM |
−1 log |ΓM |
−1dµ
= kB log |ΓM | .
Hence, although the entropy of a macrostate of such a system can be fi-
nite, it corresponds to a continuum of possible microstates. An upper limit to
entropy does not entail a finite number of possible states. I propose that the
link between entropy and information storage capacity is only valid for finite
state-space systems. When a system has an infinite number of states, but a
finite maximum entropy, I propose that it has an infinite information storage
capacity. Ultimately, each different state of a system can represent different
information, so a system with an infinite number of possible states, but a finite
volume state space, and therefore a finite maximum entropy, nevertheless has
an infinite information storage capacity.
To argue that a finite volume of space possesses a finite information storage
capacity, one might alternatively start from loop quantum gravity, and try to
argue that a finite volume of space only possesses a finite number of quantum
states. A finite volume of space corresponds to a finite number of spin network
nodes, and for a fixed finite number of nodes, there are a finite number of
spin network states. For a system with a finite number of microstates, each
macrostateM corresponds to an equivalence class containing a finite number of
microstates, Num(M). The entropy of such a macrostate is simply
S = kB logNum(M) .
Hence, a system with a finite number of microstates possesses a finite maximum
entropy, and an upper limit on its information storage capacity.
Quantum theory, however, may not be the definitive theory of the physical
world. A quantum state may correspond to many, or an infinite number of actual
states. Even though there may be only a finite number of quantum states for a
finite volume of space, there may be an infinite number of actual states. It may
be that quantum theory is only valid for certain levels of structure, and it might
merely be that the amount of information which can be coded above a certain
length scale, or the amount of information which can be coded in a certain way,
is finite.
There is also no decisive evidence that elementary particles exist. If the
current candidates for elementary particles, such as quarks, do have parts, then
those parts might only be detectable at energies which are not currently available
in particle accelerators.
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One could also dispute the assumption that, on each level of structure, there
is a finite set of parts in any finite volume of space. If each part has a non-
zero spatial extension with a well-defined boundary, and if the parts cannot
inter-penetrate, then it does indeed follow that there can only be a finite set of
parts packed into a finite volume of space. However, parts in quantum theory
do seem able to interpenetrate each other to some degree. If there are levels
of structure below the levels of the electron and quark, these might reveal very
strange things, beyond the imagination even of quantum theory, such as an
infinite number of parts interpenetrating each other in a finite volume of space.
Tipler claims that there could be a hierarchy of computer universes, just like
the hierarchy of so-called ‘virtual machines’ which can exist on a computer, and
he claims that we would not know which level of the hierarchy our own universe
exists at. Whilst I have argued that the Bekenstein bound does not entail that
a finite volume subsystem has only a finite number of possible states, Tipler
accepts this implication. This, I propose, is inconsistent with the claim that we
would not know which level of a universe hierarchy our own universe exists at.
When one computer is programmed so that it precisely mimics the input-
output behaviour of another computer, the latter is said to be emulated by
the former. The emulation program, running on the real computer, is said
to be a virtual machine. A real machine T1 can be programmed to emulate
another, producing a virtual machine T2. The virtual machine T2 can then
be programmed to emulate another computer, producing a higher level virtual
machine T3. These levels are referred to as levels of implementation.
A universe running on a computer could itself contain computers, upon
which other universes are running. The universes would be running at different
levels of implementation, and Tipler suggests, (1995, p208), that in this case, the
levels should be thought of as levels of reality. Tipler seems to assume that there
must be a lowest level of the hierarchy, and refers to this as ‘ultimate reality’.
He claims that “we cannot know if the universe in which we find ourselves is
actually ultimate reality,” (ibid.).
However, whilst any one computer may be able to emulate the input-output
behaviour of another, that does not entail that any one computer has the same
representational capacity as another. An actual computer, with a finite memory,
does not have the same representational capacity as every other computer. A
computer with N bytes of memory does not have the same representational
capacity as a computer with M bytes of memory if M > N . There may be
data structures which the computer with M bytes of memory can represent,
but which the computer with N bytes cannot.
It was argued above that a computer with a finite set of states, (and hence
a finite memory), cannot perfectly represent the universe to which it belongs.
This is because a computer with a finite memory cannot code the same amount
of information as the universe to which it belongs. In general, a computer
with a finite memory cannot perfectly represent any universe which can code
a greater amount of information than the computer. Any universe which can
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code a greater amount of information than the universe to which the computer
belongs, will code more information than the computer.
If one accepts Tipler’s claim that “complexity is appropriately measured by
the number of possible alternative states a system can be in,” (1995, p118), then
the complexity of a system can also be measured as the amount of information
which that system can code.13 If one accepts that a finite volume subsystem has
only a finite number of possible states, then a computer can only have a finite
memory. If a computer can only have a finite memory, then a computer cannot
perfectly represent a universe of the same complexity, or greater complexity,
than the universe to which the computer belongs. The complexity of a universe
is observable, hence, contra Tipler, the levels of implementation are distinguish-
able. If a finite volume subsystem has only a finite number of possible states,
then each higher level of universe implementation is less complex than the level
below. A computer with a finite memory cannot perfectly represent a universe
unless that universe is simpler than the universe to which the computer belongs.
The more complex the universe one belongs to, the lower down the hierarchy
that universe is placed. A universe of maximal complexity, if there is such a
thing, could be proven to be the universe of ultimate reality.
If our universe is a computer program running on a computer in another
universe, then that universe must have a higher level of complexity to our own.
This greater complexity might take the form of a higher number of spatial
dimensions.
Of course, if a finite volume subsystem has a discrete infinity of possible
states, then a computer might be able to perfectly represent a universe with the
same complexity as the universe to which the computer belongs. If so, then the
levels of universe implementation might all have the same level of complexity.
The point is that, if the Bekenstein bound does entail that a finite volume
subsystem has only a finite number of possible states, then the Bekenstein bound
is inconsistent with the thesis that universes at different levels of implementation
are indistinguishable.
13This should not be confused with the computational complexity of an algorithm used to
calculate the values of a function. This is a measure of the growth in computation time with
the growth of the size of the input. For example, those functions which are computable by an
algorithm in polynomial time, are referred to as P problems. (See Penrose (1989), p181-187,
for a good introduction). Tipler’s notion of complexity is also distinct from the Kolmogorov
complexity of an object, also known as the algorithmic complexity. The Kolmogorov complex-
ity of a bit-string is the length, in bits, of the shortest computer program capable of producing
that bit-string as output. By extension, if one has a digital representation of an object by a
bit-string, one can define the Kolmogorov complexity of that representation to be the length,
in bits, of the shortest computer program capable of producing that digital representation as
output.
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4 Supervenience, identity, and universe creation
on a computer
The suggestion that a physical system can be perfectly simulated on a computer
is consistent with the principle of supervenience, but suggests that a physical
system can be realised on more than one medium. Suppose, for example, that
a tornado could be perfectly simulated on a computer. A tornado is described
by a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations.14 To simulate a tornado on a
computer, one would define program variables to represent the air pressure,
velocity, density etc. in a volume of space, and one would represent the tornado
by calculating a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations for these variables.
Whilst a ‘real’ tornado is a process running on a collection of air molecules, a
simulated tornado is a process running upon the components and circuitry of a
computer. Hence, if a tornado could be perfectly simulated on a computer, one
might argue that a tornado could be realised upon more than one medium. The
processes associated with two completely different lower-level media, appear to
be capable of yielding the same higher-level process. In the particular case of
the simulation of a mind on a computer, Bostrom describes this as the notion
of ‘substrate-independence’, arguing that “mental states can supervene on any
of a broad class of physical substrates,” (Bostrom 2003, Section II).
Supervenience basically proposes that the parts of a system, and the way in
which the parts are organized and interact, uniquely determine the higher-level
states and properties of the system. In other words, the states and properties
of the subsystems in a composite system, and the relationships between the
subsystems, uniquely determine the higher-level states and properties of the
composite system. The idea is that there can be no difference in the higher-
level state of a composite system without a difference in the lower-level state,
otherwise one would have a one-many correspondence between the lower-level
states and higher-level states.
If a physical system could be realised on more than one medium, it would
not undermine the principle of supervenience. For example, the properties of a
tornado might not determine a unique medium upon which it must be realised,
but the properties of air molecules, and the relationships between air molecules,
entail that a tornado can be realised on a collection of air molecules. Similarly,
if it were possible to realise a tornado on a computer, then it would be the
properties of, and relationships between, the components and circuitry of a
computer which would entail that a tornado could be realised upon a computer.
Whether or not a physical system can in fact be realised on more than one
medium depends upon how one defines the identity of a system. In the case of
a tornado there are two possible approaches:
(a). A tornado is a physical system composed of atmospheric molecules, which
has the property that it satisfies a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes
14There is, for example, an exact solution of the Navier-Stokes equations called the Sullivan
Vortex, which describes the flow in an intense tornado with a central downdraft.
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equations. The identity of a tornado is inseparable from being a collection
of atmospheric molecules. A tornado is not as much realised upon a collec-
tion of atmospheric molecules, as it is composed of atmospheric molecules.
A tornado cannot be realised on more than one medium because there is
no sense in which a tornado is realised on any medium. It is only if the
identity of a tornado could be defined in a formal, mathematical sense,
that one could speak of a tornado being realised upon a medium.
(b). The identity of a tornado is defined by a solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations, and the identity of a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations
is independent of any particular medium, hence the identity of a tornado
is independent of any particular medium. The identity of a tornado is
independent of its realisation upon a collection of atmospheric molecules.
If the components and circuitry of a computer could realise a tornado-
solution of the Navier-Stokes equations, then a tornado could be realised
on the components and circuitry of a computer.
The identity of a solution to the Navier-Stokes equations is independent of
any particular physical medium because a solution of a differential equation is
merely a mathematical object. A solution to a differential equation is given
physical meaning when the solution variables are given a physical reference i.e.
physical units. The solution variables of a differential equation can refer to
many different things: consider, for example, the diverse domains in which one
can find solutions to the wave equation or the diffusion equation.
When a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations is realised on a medium, the
solution variables have physical referents. When a solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations is realised on the medium of atmospheric molecules, the solution vari-
ables refer to air pressure, velocity, density etc. If, alternatively, a solution could
be realised on, say, an economic system, then the solution variables would refer
to economic quantities instead.
For a computer to be able to realise a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations, the computer must possess objective physical properties which could
be the referents of the tornado-solution variables. Whilst it is permissable for
these properties of the computer to be compound or collective properties, they
must be objective physical properties. If a tornado-solution were to be realised
on a computer, the solution variables would not refer to properties of the at-
mosphere, such as pressure, velocity, density etc. Instead, they would refer to
properties of the computer components and circuitry, such as, perhaps, the volt-
age states of the bytes in computer memory. To reiterate, the medium upon
which a solution is realised is defined by the referents assigned to the solution
variables.
It is possible to accept approach (b), that the identity of a tornado is inde-
pendent of any particular medium, without accepting that a tornado can be re-
alised on a computer. A computer does not possess objective physical properties
which can be the referents of the solution variables for the Navier-Stokes equa-
tions. One reason is that the solution variables are continuous, whilst the logical
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states of electronic circuits are discrete. A tornado-solution to the Navier-Stokes
equations is probably a bad example at this juncture because the Navier-Stokes
equations, and fluid mechanics in toto, merely provide a phenomenological ap-
proximation.15 A tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equations is not exactly
realised on the medium of air molecules either. However, even if one goes down
to the level of fundamental physics, a computer cannot exactly realise solutions
to the fundamental equations of physics either. The reason is twofold:
• There is a one-many correspondence between the logical states and the
exact electronic states of circuits.
• The logical states of multiple bits in computer memory only represent
numbers because they are deemed to do so under a numeric-interpretation.
In contemporary digital computers, each bit of memory corresponds to an
electrical circuit, and the two possible logical states of the bit correspond to
different possible voltages between fixed points of the circuit. The logical state
of 1 is not defined by a single precise voltage value, but by a range of values, and
the logical state of 0 is defined by a different range of possible voltages. There
is, therefore, a one-many correspondence between logical states and voltage
levels. Successive runs of the same program will not produce exactly the same
sequence of electronic states in computer memory. The exact voltage levels will
be different on successive runs.
This level of electrical noise prevents a contemporary digital computer from
exactly realising anything, even discrete objects. Given the one-many corre-
spondence between logical states and exact electronic states, the exact electronic
properties of a computer’s components cannot be the referents of the Navier-
Stokes solution variables. At best, this suggests that a tornado-solution of the
Navier-Stokes equations could only be approximately realised on a digital com-
puter. This is crucial to the question of whether the same physical system can
be realised on more than one physical medium. If there cannot be an exact re-
alisation of a tornado on the medium provided by the components and circuitry
of a computer, this is presumably because the properties of, and relationships
between, the components and circuitry of a computer differ from the properties
of, and relationships between, the air molecules in a region of the atmosphere.
Moreover, it is not even possible to contend that a tornado-solution of the
Navier-Stokes equations could be approximately realised on a digital computer.
A computer simulation provides no type of realisation at all. It is not the log-
ical states of multiple electrical circuits in computer memory, but the numeric
interpretation of the logical states which are the candidates to be referents of
the tornado solution variables. It is the pattern of numbers represented by a
computer which resembles the pattern of values realised by a simulated system’s
physical quantities. As explained in the next section, the numbers represented
15i.e Fluid mechanics is able to explain and predict a range of macroscopic phenomena to a
certain degree of approximation, but more fundamental theories are required to describe what
actually exists and happens.
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by a computer are interpretation-dependent, hence the numbers represented by
a computer cannot be objective physical properties of the computer. If the num-
bers represented by the computer are interpretation-dependent, then the pattern
of numbers represented by the computer must be an interpretation-dependent
pattern. Hence, the resemblance between the pattern of numbers represented
by the computer and the pattern of values possessed by the physical quanti-
ties of a simulated system, must be an interpretation-dependent resemblance.
Change the interpretation of the logical states of the multiple electrical circuits
in computer memory, and there is no resemblance, not even an approximate
one. Even if there was no electrical noise, and even if the simulated system
was discrete itself, (even if there was a bijective correspondence), it would still
be an interpretation-dependent resemblance. The numbers represented by the
computer are not objective physical properties of the computer. To constitute a
realisation of a Navier-Stokes tornado-solution, the referents of the solution vari-
ables must be objective physical properties, not interpretation-dependent, hence
a computer cannot realise a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equations, or
any other physical system for that matter.
5 A digital computer simulation of a universe
cannot exist as a universe
A digital computer simulation of a physical system cannot exist as, (does not
possess the properties and relationships of), anything else other than a physical
process occurring upon the components of a computer. In the contemporary
case of an electronic digital computer, a simulation cannot exist as anything else
other than an electronic physical process occurring upon the components and
circuitry of a computer. The following argument will be deployed to establish
this conclusion:
1. A digital computer simulation is a type of representation.
2. There are three types of representation.
3. A digital computer simulation is a special case of the type of represen-
tation in which there is no objective relationship, and in particular no
homomorphy, between the represented thing and the thing which repre-
sents it.
4. If there is no objective relationship between a universe and a digital com-
puter simulation of a universe, then a digital computer simulation of a
universe cannot exist as a universe.
The reasoning that justifies claim 3, outlined at the end of the previous
section, is basically as follows: In a computer simulation, the values of the
physical quantities possessed by the simulated system are represented by the
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combined states of multiple bits16 in computer memory. However, the combined
states of multiple bits in computer memory only represent numbers because they
are deemed to do so under a numeric interpretation. There are many different
interpretations of the combined states of multiple bits in computer memory. If
the numbers represented by a digital computer are interpretation-dependent,
they cannot be objective physical properties. Hence, there can be no objective
relationship between the changing pattern of multiple bit-states in computer
memory, and the changing pattern of quantity-values of a simulated physical
system.
Because a digital computer simulation of a universe cannot exist as a uni-
verse, it is, a fortiori, impossible for anyone to be embedded in a digital computer
simulation. It is impossible for our experience to be indistinguishable from the
experience of someone embedded in a digital computer simulation because it is
impossible for anyone to be embedded in a digital computer simulation.
Tipler and Bostrom both assume that if a universe is simulated on a com-
puter, then the simulation exists as a universe, at a so-called ‘higher level of
implementation’. This ontological assumption can be generalized to the follow-
ing proposition: If a physical system of type T is simulated on a computer,
then the simulation exists as a system of type T , at a higher level of imple-
mentation. For example, if a tornado is simulated on a computer, it could be
claimed that the simulation exists as a tornado, at a higher level of implemen-
tation. In opposition, it will be argued in this section that a digital computer
simulation of a physical system, even a perfect simulation, cannot exist as the
thing it represents.
A computer simulation is a special type of representation. In general, a
representation is defined by a mapping f which specifies the correspondence
between the represented thing and the thing which represents it. An object, or
the state of an object, can be represented in two different ways:
1. If an object/state is a structured entityM , it can provide the entire domain
of a mapping f :M → f(M) which defines the representation. The range
of the mapping, f(M), is also a structured entity. The mapping f is a
homomorphism with respect to some level of structure possessed by M
and f(M).
2. An object/state can be an element x ∈ M in the domain of a mapping
f :M → f(M) which defines the representation.
The representation of a Formula One car by a wind-tunnel model is an
example of type-1 representation. There is an approximate homothetic iso-
morphism17 from the exterior surface of the model to the exterior surface of a
Formula One car. This notion of structure preservation can be seen in other
16Qubits in the case of quantum computers.
17A transformation which changes only the scale factor.
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cases of representation. The notorious map of the London Underground does
not preserve geometry, but it does preserve the topology of the network. Hence
in this case, there is a homeomorphic isomorphism involved.
Type-2 representation has two sub-types. The mapping f : M → f(M)
can be defined by either (2i) an objective, causal physical process, or by (2ii)
the decisions of thinking-beings. The three different types of representation are
similar to C.S. Peirce’s tripartite division of representational ‘signs’ into ‘icons’,
‘indices’, and ‘symbols’. Peirce held that icons resemble what they represent,
indices are causally connected to what they represent, and symbols are arbitrary
labels for what they represent, (see Schwartz 1995, p536-537).
The primary example of type-2i representation is the representation of the
external world by brain states. Taking the example of visual perception, there
is no homomorphism between the spatial geometry of an individual’s visual
field, and the state of the neuronal network in that part of the brain which
deals with vision. However, the correspondence between brain states and the
external world is not an arbitrary mapping. It is a correspondence defined by a
causal physical process involving photons of light, the human eye, the retina, and
the human brain. The correspondence exists independently of human decision-
making.
As an example of type-2ii representation, the state of a light switch could be
used to represent things other than itself. One could decide that the On-position
of a light switch represents the number 1, and the Off-position represents the
number 0. This relationship between the states of the light switch and the set
{0, 1} does not exist objectively. In other words, the relationship does not exist
independently of the interpretative decisions made by human-beings. Someone
else could decide that the On-position represents the number 0, and that the Off-
position represents the number 1. One could even decide that the On-position
of a light switch represents the colour black, and the Off-position represents the
colour white. There is no homomorphism between the On-position of a light
switch and either the number 1 or the colour black. The position of the light
switch is merely being used as an element in the domain of a mapping which
defines the representation.
In the case of a digital computer simulation, the bytes of memory are used
to represent numbers and numbers are used to represent the quantities of the
simulated system. Hence, the representation of a tornado by the logical states
of a current digital computer is an example of type-2ii representation. There
is no homomorphism between the electronic states or logical states of a current
digital computer and the things those states are chosen to represent.18 The
logical states of a computer can be mapped to many different things, (numbers,
images, and sounds etc), but in each case a logical state is merely an element in
the domain of the mapping which defines the representation. The logical state of
a computer is not the domain of a homomorphic mapping, and human decisions,
18Recall that there is a one-many correspondence between the logical states and the ex-
act electronic states of computer memory. Although there are bijective mappings between
numbers and the logical states of computer memory, there are no bijective mappings between
numbers and the exact electronic states of memory.
33
rather than causal processes, determine what things the logical states of a digital
computer represent. For these reasons, the states of a digital computer are not
objectively related to that which they are deemed to represent.
Whilst the electronic states of a current digital computer do indeed possess
a quite intricate structure, that structure is not used for the representational
applications of a computer. The state of each bit in the memory of a computer
is defined by the 1-dimensional graph topology of an electrical circuit, and by
the voltage between specific points of the circuit. Hence, the memory-state of
a computer is something which possesses a quite intricate structure. However,
this electrical circuit and voltage structure bears no resemblance to the things
which the memory of a computer is deemed to represent.
If a digital computer simulation of a universe is a type-2ii representation,
then a digital computer simulation of a universe is not objectively related to
that universe. This rules out the claim that a digital computer simulation could
exist as a universe.
Bostrom’s hypothesis that we could be living in a computer simulation as-
sumes that “it would suffice for the generation of subjective experience [in a
computer simulation] that the computational processes of a human brain are
structurally replicated in suitably fine-grained detail,” (Bostrom 2003, Section
II). The notion of ‘structural replication’ is the same as the notion of isomor-
phism, so Bostrom’s hypothesis that we could be living in a computer simula-
tion is based upon the false assumption that a computer simulation provides
the type of representation in which an isomorphism or homomorphism exists.
Hence, even if one endorses the notion of ‘structural realism’, that a thing is
completely defined by its structural mathematical relationships, one cannot say
that a digital computer simulation realises the thing it represents.
Although the states of a digital computer are not objectively related to the
things they are deemed to represent, it is possible that the states of an analog
computer could be so related. It is conceivable that there could be a homomor-
phism between the states of an analog computer and the things those states
represent. Whilst an analog computer does not necessarily resemble the system
it represents in terms of geometry or topology, a homomorphism between phys-
ical objects is not necessarily a homomorphism of spatial geometry or topology.
The examples of a wind-tunnel model and the London Underground map are
misleading in this respect. The homomorphism could be a non-visual homomor-
phism. An analog computer could possess objective physical properties which
change with the same pattern as the changing pattern of values for the phys-
ical quantities on a simulated system. Hence, an analog computer simulation
might provide type-1 representation. If this is so, then a more general argument
would be required to demonstrate that no type of computer simulation at all
could exist as a universe.
In the examples of type-1 representation given above, although there is a
physical resemblance in some respects betweenM and f(M), there is not a total
resemblance. For example, although the parts of a wind-tunnel model subtend
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the same angles as the actual car, the wind-tunnel model is not the same size
as the actual car. Despite such examples, there is no reason in principle why a
type-1 representor cannot possess all the properties of the thing it represents.
At least, there is no reason why a type-1 representor cannot possess all the
‘intrinsic’ properties of the thing it represents.19
If a type-1 representor possesses all the intrinsic properties of the thing it
represents, then one might conclude that it exists as the same type of thing as the
thing it represents. Accordingly, an analog computer simulation of a universe
might exist as a universe. However, to reiterate a point made in section 3, it
remains to be proven that an analog computer can possess the representational
capacity to represent an entire universe.
Tipler and Bostrom both imagine a computer simulation which would sim-
ulate all the people who exist in our own universe. Such simulated people, it
is suggested, would reflect upon the fact that they think, would interact with
their apparent environment, and would conclude that they exist. The claim
that a simulated universe would be real to the simulated people, presupposes
that simulated systems provide realisations of those systems, and presupposes
that simulated people exist as people. Digital computer simulations of people
exist only as physical processes on a computer, not as people. Hence, there are
no people in a digital computer simulation to reflect upon the fact that they
think, or to interact with their apparent environment.
If a digital computer simulation of a universe cannot exist as a universe, then
the sceptical hypotheses of Tipler and Bostrom cannot be true. It is impossible
that our own experience is indistinguishable from the experience of somebody
embedded in a digital computer simulation because it is impossible for anybody
to be embedded in a digital computer simulation. Systems cannot be realised
in digital computer simulations, and people cannot exist in digital computer
simulations.
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